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THE BRADY ACT: SHOT DOWN BY THE
TENTH AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the attempt on President Reagan's life, a major
gun control lobby organization ran full-page ads in a dozen major
newspapers. "The headline read, 'The Day the President Was
Shot Was an Average Kind of Day,' average because [fifty]
Americans were killed by handguns."' It is estimated that there
are over 200 million firearms in this country with a growth rate
of between three and four million per annum.2 After years of
public outcry about the increased violence in this country' and the
ease of obtaining a handgun,4 President Clinton signed the Brady
IJohn Herbers, Gun Control Group Builds in Intensity, N.Y. Tiams, Oct.
22, 1981, at B14.
2 See Andre Henderson, Gun Control's Costly Ammunition, 7 CoNG. Q. DBA
GovERNING MAGAZINE 8, 23 (1994); see also William J. Vizzard, The Impact
of Agenda Conflict on Policy Formulation and Implementation: The Case of
Gun Control, JuLY/AUGUST 1995, PUB. ADMIN. REV. 341, 347 n.5 (noting
that the author spent 27 years with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms in various capacities, including special agent, supervisor, and
manager).
3 See WARREN FREEDMAN, THE PRivILEGE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 1-2
(1989) (voicing concern of the public as violent crimes increase); see also LEE
KENNETF & JAMES LAVERaNE ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMRICA: THE
ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL DILEMA 231-32 (1975) (stating that a week after
President Kennedy's death a dozen firearms bills had been placed before
Congress); see also Kevin A. Fox & Nutan Christine Shah, Note, Natural
Born Killers: The Assault Weapons Ban of the Crime Bill - Legitimate Exercise
of Congressional Authority to Control Violent Crime or Infringement of a
Constitutional Guarantee?, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 123, 123
(1994) (explaining that the title of this note was taken from a 1994 movie by
the same name which portrays the lives of a couple who go on a murderous
rampage throughout the country becoming heroes in the process); see also
Ronald A. Giller, Note, Federal Gun Control in the United States: Revival of
the Tenth Amendment, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 151, 151-52
(1994); see also Violence Has Become a Way of Life, UPI, Mar. 30, 1981,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file.
' See David Nagy, Saturday-Night Specials - Plentiful and Easy to Get, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Apr. 13, 1981, at 29. The author chronicled the
history of the gun John Hinckley, Jr. used in the attempted assassination of
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Handgun Violence Prevention Act [hereinafter "Brady" or "The
Act"] 5 into law calling it "'step one in taking our streets back,
taking our children back, reclaiming our families and our
future.'" 6
As Alexis de Tocqueville postulated, "[T]he power vested in
the American courts of justice of pronouncing a statute to be
unconstitutional, forms one of the most powerful barriers which
has ever been devised against the tyranny of political
assemblies. " 7  This Comment discusses whether the Act's
background check provision contravenes the constitutional
principles of federalism 8 embodied in the Tenth Amendment. 9
Part 110 sets forth the relevant provisions of the Act. Part IIV
explains recent Supreme Court decisions involving the Tenth
Amendment. Part fI 12 explores the split in the federal courts of
appeal concerning this issue. Part IV 3 discusses the Supreme
Court's decision in Printz v. United States, 4 that held the Act
unconstitutional.15 Part V 16 examines the underlying policy issues
and presents an analysis of the Supreme Court decision.
President Reagan. Id. at 29. Hinckley purchased the gun from a pawn shop
after filling out a federal form and showing his driver's license. Id. The fact
that he had been arrested four days before and charged with carrying three
guns was not recorded or required on the form. Id.
I Brady Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994)).
6 Nancy Mathis, Emotional Ceremony Marks President's Signing of Brady
Bill, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 1, 1993 at Al.
7 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 51 (Andrew Hacker
ed., Washington Square Press 1964) (1835).
8 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 612 (6th ed. 1990) (defining federalism as a
"[tierm which includes interrelationships among the states and relationships
between the states and the federal government.").
" The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
10 See infra notes 17-32 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 33-57 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 58-105 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 106-126 and accompanying text.
14 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
15 Id. at 2384.
528 [Vol 14
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 14 [1998], No. 2, Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss2/15
BRADYACT
I. THE BRADY ACT
The Brady Act, which was named after former White House
press secretary James Brady and passed as an amendment to the
Gun Control Act of 1968 [hereinafter "GCA"]," placed
additional restrictions on the sale of firearms. 8 In particular, it
imposed a mandatory five-day waiting period and background
check. 19  Prior to the passage of Brady, the GCA made it
unlawful for a federally licensed firearm dealer [hereinafter
"FLFD"] to sell or transfer a firearm to anyone who did not
meet certain criteria established by Congress." The FLFDs
relied on the sworn statements of their customers attesting to their
capacity to meet the government's criteria for firearm purchase. 21
16 See infra notes 127-151 and accompanying text.
17 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1968).
Is 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1) (1994).
19 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1) (1994).
20 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1)-(4) (1968). This section states:
It shall be unlawful for any licensed importer, licensed
manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector to sell or
otherwise dispose of any firearm or ammunition to any
person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that
such person-
(1) is under indictment for, or has been convicted in any
court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year;
(2) is a fugitive from justice;
(3) is an unlawful user of or addicted to marihuana or any
depressant or stimulant drug ... or narcotic drug ...or
(4) has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been
committed to any mental institution.
Id.
21 27 C.F.R. § 178.124 (1997). The regulation states in pertinent part:
The transferee also must date and execute the sworn
statement showing that... the transferee is not prohibited by
the provisions of the Act from shipping or transporting a
firearm in interstate or foreign commerce or receiving a
firearm which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce or possessing a firearm in or affecting
commerce; and that the transferee's receipt of the firearm
1998
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Under the Act, prospective handgun purchasers, in most
cases, are required to complete a new information form,'
containing both a sworn statement and biographical data,24 which
must be transmitted within one day of its receipt by the FLFD to
the Chief Law Enforcement Officer [hereinafter "CLEO"] 2 of
the community in which the applicant resides.
When the CLEO receives the information, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 922(s)(2), he or she "shall make a reasonable effort to
ascertain within [five] business days whether receipt or
possession would be in violation of the law, including research in
would not be in violation of any statute of the State or
published ordinance applicable to the locality in which the
transferee resides.
Id.
2, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(B)-(F) (1994). The statute states that there are
several exceptions to the background check provisions of the Act including,
among others: when the transferee has written permission from the CLEO of
the transferee's state of residence and can prove that the gun is needed to
protect the life of the transferee or the transferee's family; the transferee holds
a gun permit issued within the last 5 years by the state in which the transferee
resides showing compliance with similar background check provisions. Id.
23 27 C.F.R. § 178.102 (1997). The regulation states in pertinent part:
[A] licensed dealer shall not sell, deliver, or transfer a
handgun. . . to any individual who is not licensed... unless
the licensee...
(3) Within 1 day... provides notice of the contents of the
statement. .. to the chief law enforcement officer of the
place of residence of the transferee;
(4) Within 1 day after the transferee furnishes the statement
to the licensee, transmits a copy of Form 5300.35 to the chief
law enforcement officer of the place of residence of the
transferee; and
(5)(I) Five business days ... have elapsed from the date the
licensee furnished actual notice of the contents of the
statement to the chief law enforcement officer, during which
period the licensee has not received information from such
officer that receipt or possession of the handgun by the
transferee would be in violation of Federal, State, or local
law ....
Id.
24 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (1994).
25 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(III)-(IY).
530 [Vol 14
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whatever State and local record-keeping systems' are available
and in a national system designated by the Attorney General."2,
The FLFD is not allowed to sell or transfer the firearm until
either the CLEO has notified the FLFD that it is not prohibited
by law or five business days have elapsed.2
The CLEO's duties do not end, however, with the completion
of the background check. If the CLEO ascertains that the
applicant may legally purchase the gun from the FLFD, the
CLEO must, within twenty business days after the applicant made
the statement, destroy the information obtained and any records
generated from it.29 In addition, if the CLEO determines that a
person is ineligible to purchase a firearm, the CLEO must, if
requested by the disapproved applicant, provide the reasons in
writing within twenty days.3" The CLEO's responsibilities will
2 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). This section provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) who has been convicted in any court, of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
(2) who is a fugitive from justice;
(3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled
substance ...;
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who
has been committed to a mental institution;
(5) who, being an alien, is illegally or unlawfully in the
United States;
(6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under
dishonorable conditions;
(7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has
renounced his citizenship;
(8) [who is subject to certain restraining orders involving an
intimate partner]; or
(9) who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence
to ... possess ... or to receive any firearm ... which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
Id.
27 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2).
2 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)(1)-(n).
2 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(603)(i).
30 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(6)(C).
1998 531
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end in 199831 when the FLFDs will have access to a national
background check system that will be implemented by the U.S.
Department of Justice.32 The FLFDs will be notified within three
days should the prospective purchase violate the Act.33
II. THE TENTH AMENDMENT: FEDERALISM AND OUR
NATION'S HIGHEST COURT
The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." 34 In New York v. United States,35 Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor stated that the question of "the proper division of
authority between the Federal Government and the States" is
perhaps "our oldest question of constitutional law." 36 In recent
years, cases challenging the constitutionality of statutes have
caused the Supreme Court to address precisely this question.
In National League of Cities v. Usery,37 the Court, by a five-
to-four margin, held that the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act [hereinafter "FLSA"], that applied federal
minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to almost all
employees of state governments, were unconstitutional.38 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, championed the principles of
federalism when he concluded that "[t]he [Tenth] Amendment
expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not
exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or
their ability to function effectively in a federal system."' 39 If
31 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1).
32 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1)(B)(ii).
33 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1)(B)(ii).
I See supra note 9.
3 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
36 Id. at 149.
37 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit.
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
31 Id. at 852.
39 Id. at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
In Fry, the Supreme Court held that. that federal economic controls did not
532 [Vol 14
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Congress could remove from the States the authority to make
decisions about their own employment policies, " 'we think there
would be little left of the States' separate and independent
existence.' "40
This understanding of the Tenth Amendment was short-lived,
however, for in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,41 the Court, by a five to four margin, overruled its
decision in National League of Cities.42 In Garcia, the Court
once again considered the question of the constitutionality of the
FLSA's minimum wage and maximum hour requirements, this
time as applied to a publicly owned mass transit system.43 Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, held that the provisions of
the FLSA did not contravene the limits of Congress' power,
although he did state that "we continue to recognize that the
States occupy a special and specific position in our constitutional
system and that the scope of Congress' authority ... must reflect
that position." 44  The Court explained that the States were
protected from federal overreaching by the "built-in restraints"
of state participation in federal government and that the "political
process" would ensure that the States were not "unduly
burden[ed]" by unfair laws.4'
Garcia and National League of Cities are not easily
distinguished because both cases concern the same issue - the
application of the FLSA to the States. Perhaps the distinction can
best be understood by considering the difficulty the Court
interfere with state affairs since it could be found that Congress had a " rational
basis upon which to conclude that the state activity substantially affected
commerce." Fry, 421 U.S. at 545.
o Id. at 851 (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)). In Coyle,
the Supreme Court stated that "the constitutional equality of the States is
essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic
was organized. When that equality disappears we may remain a free people,
but the Union will not be the Union of the Constitution." Coyle, 221 U.S. at
580.
41 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
42 Id. at 531.
43 Id. at 530.
"Id. at 556.45 Id.
1998 533
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encountered when applying the National League of Cities analysis
in subsequent cases. In Garcia, Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority,46 explained that trying to decide whether "traditional
governmental functions" were implicated (an integral part of the
National League of Cities opinion) had proved extremely
unworkable.47 More likely than not it was this very dilemma that
prompted the Court to overrule National League of Cities and
abandon this test.48 In essence, Justice Blackmun all but
relinquished the role of the Court in reviewing the "oldest
question of constitutional law,",49 the division of power between
the States and the federal government. It seemed as though the
Tenth Amendment was all but dead.
Not every member of the Court welcomed the Amendment's
demise, as evidenced by Justice Powell's dissenting opinion.5"
Joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice
O'Connor, he concluded that the result of the majority's holding,
the relinquishment of judicial review, was "inconsistent with the
fundamental principles of our constitutional system."'" Justice
Powell explained that the Court ignored the "integral role of the
Tenth Amendment in our constitutional theory" and that "judicial
enforcement of the Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining
the federal system so carefully designed by the Framers and
adopted in the Constitution."52
Thus, in light of the previous dissent, it came as no surprise
when in New York v. United States,53 a majority of the Court held
that a provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985, 54 requiring States to either regulate the
low-level radioactive waste generated within their borders or to
46 Id. at 530.
471 d. at 538-39.
48 Id. at 546-47.
49 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
50 Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 570 (Powell, J., dissenting).
53 New York, 505 U.S. at 177.
1 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-573, 94
Stat. 3347 (1980).
[Vol 14
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"take tide" to the waste and assume all legal responsibility, was
"inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government
established by the Constitution." 55
New York involved the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Act of 1980 [hereinafter "LRWPA"]," which had been passed by
Congress to avert a possible nationwide crisis, since it appeared
that soon there might be no sites left to dispose of radioactive
waste." The LRWPA allowed States to enter into regional
compacts that, beginning in 1986, could restrict the use of the
compacts' disposal facilities to member States.5" Unfortunately,
by 1985, only three of the regional compacts had made their
disposal facilities operational. 9 Congress, with less than a year
to go until the 1986 restrictions would become effective,
approved the amendments to the LRWPA, 6° which became the
source of the controversy.61
The amendments contained three varieties of incentives that
encouraged the States to dispose of their radioactive waste. 6'
Two of the incentives were not of concern in this litigation.'
The third incentive, referred to as the "take title" provision,'
precipitated the constitutional challenge.' That provision gave
state governments two options - accept ownership of the waste
generated within its borders or regulate according to Congress'
plan.66 As the Court explained, the problem with these options
was that they presented no options at all; no matter which
direction states chose, they "[could] not decline to administer the
5 New York, 505 U.S. at 177.
56 See supra note 54.
57New York, 505 U.S. at 150.
581 d. at 151.
59Id.
o42 U.S.C. § 2021c-e (1986).
61 New York, 505 U.S. at 151.
6Id. at 152.
6 Id. at 173-74.
6Id. at 174.
6 Id. at 174-75.
6Id. at 175.
1998 535
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federal program ... [they] must follow the direction of
Congress. "67
Justice O'Connor, writing for majority, noted that:
Some truths are so basic that, like the air around us, they are
easily overlooked. States are not mere political subdivisions
of the United States. State governments are neither regional
offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal Government.
The Constitution instead "leaves to the several States a
residuary and inviolable sovereignty," (citation omitted)
reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment.
Whatever the outer limits of that sovereignty may be, one
thing is clear: The Federal Government may not compel the
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. 68
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL
Sheriff Richard Mack was quite troubled69 when he received
notice from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
("BATF") directing him to conduct the background checks
mandated by Brady.70 So much so that Mack, the Sheriff of a
small Arizona county, sued to have the law declared
67 Id. at 177.
68 Id. at 187-88.
I9 See also Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinary: May
Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM.
L. REv. 1001, 1002-03 (1995) (explaining that many local officials oppose
instances where they must enforce laws regulating private behavior).
70 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1994).
536 [Vol 14
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unconstitutional.7  After he won,7 as did Sheriff Printz in
Montana, the Ninth Circuit consolidated the appeals.74
A. The Ninth And Second Circuits Find Brady Still Within
Constitutional Bounds
In Mack v. United States,75 the Ninth Circuit sought to resolve
the conflict between the Act and the Tenth Amendment7 6 by
noting that the regulatory program was aimed not at the States but
at individuals. 7  In its analysis of the Tenth Amendment
challenge, the court noted that the Amendment " 'states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered' "71 and
that the "Amendment does not purport to limit ... the power of
Congress. " 79  However, the court explained, recent
interpretations of the Amendment have encompassed " 'any
71 See Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (D. Ariz. 1994),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub
nom, Printz v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996).
7 See Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1381.
See Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1519 (D. Mont. 1994),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir.
1995), cert. granted, Printz v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996).
74 See Printz v. United States, No. 95-1478 (D. Mont. filed June 17, 1996)
(order consolidating appeal); see also Mack v. United States, No. 95-1503
(D. Ariz. filed June 17, 1996) (order consolidating appeal).
7 Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995).
76 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
-n Mack, 66 F.3d at 1031.
7 Id. at 1029 (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).
In Darby, the Supreme Court found the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 did
not violate the Tenth Amendment noting that:
There is nothing in the history of [the Tenth Amendment's]
adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the
relationship between the national and state governments as it
had been established by the Constitution before the
amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears
that the new national government might seek to exercise
powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to
exercise fully their reserved powers.
Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
79Mack, 66 F.3d at 1029.
1998
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implied constitutional limitation on Congress' authority to
regulate state activities ... ' "80and that it must consider whether
Brady has transgressed such limitations. 8
In Mack it was argued that, as a result of New York, the
federal government was no longer allowed to commandeer
employees of the State to carry out its programs. However, the
court noted that the holding in New York concerned itself with a
different type of commandeering -- attempting to have the States
legislate following a federal formula.83 The court reasoned that
"[t]he Brady Act is a regulatory program aimed at individuals
and not the States. " 84 Because the CLEOs are not involved in
policy-making for which the state might be held accountable, but
rather serve in typical law enforcement functions, Brady is "not
different from other minor obligations that Congress has imposed
on state officials."85 Therefore, the court concluded that the Act
did not violate the Tenth Amendment. 6
Further support was gathered for Brady when the Second
Circuit found the Act consistent with the structure of the Tenth
Amendment. In Frank v. United States,88 the court explained
that "the severity of the burden placed on States is the touchstone
for determining whether national legislation is so onerous as to
threaten the effectiveness of the States in our federal system." 89
The court, when comparing the "take title" provision in New
York with the Act, noted that Brady is different because States are
required neither to enact regulations fashioned from their own
solutions nor to become politically responsible in the handgun
80 Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 511 n. 5 (1988)
(finding that federal tax on the interest paid on state bonds did not violate
Tenth Amendment)).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1030.
8 Id.
8 Id. at 1031.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1034.
8 See Frank v. United States, 78 F.3d 815, 820 (2d Cir. 1996), vacated, 117
S. Ct. 2501 (1997).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 826.
538 [Vol 14
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control field.' The court concluded that because there is no
compelled regulation "the roles of the federal government and the
States under the Brady Act are consistent with the values
underlying federalism." 91
B. The Fifth Circuit Finds Brady Has Gone Too Far
The Fifth Circuit came to exactly the opposite conclusion in
Koog v. United States9 when it held the background check
provision of Brady unconstitutional.93 The court noted that the
opinion in New York would guide its decision in Koog and
proceeded to examine it carefully. 94 The court explained that
when a statute allows a state the choice of whether to participate
in a federal program, a political choice is made by the state for
which it may be held accountable by its constituents. 95 On the
other hand, if the government demands enactment of a federal
regulatory program, this "strips state officials of control over
state policies and diminishes the accountability of both state and
federal officials." 6
From this examination, the court derived four guiding
principles. 7  First, the states may not be coerced into
"administering a federal regulatory program or into legislating
according to a federal formula." 98 The court found that because
the Act imposes duties upon the CLEOs not prescribed by state
statute it is "tantamount to forced state legislation." 9
Second, impermissible coercion occurs when "the States are
precluded from rejecting the role envisioned for them by the
Id. at 828.
91 Id.
92 79 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom, United States v.
Gonzalez, 117 S. Ct. 2507 (1997).
93 Koog, 79 F.3d at 453.
9MId. at 455.
95 Id. at 456-57.
96 Id. at 457 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 167-69).
91Id. at 457.
98 Id.
99Id. at 458.
1998 539
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federal government." '0o Here, the court found that because the
Act has no "walk-away opportunity" for the states, the states are
"victims of impermissible federal coercion. ' '  Third, this
coercion "threatens state sovereignty because it strips States of
choice and control over state policies."" The court said that
state sovereignty was undermined by "requiring a state to allow
CLEOs to perform duties that the State obviously prefers to
avoid." 103
Lastly, federal commandeering "blurs political accountability,
a democratic value protected by the principles of federalism.""0
The court reasoned that because the CLEOs have to make
decisions concerning what constitutes a "reasonable search,"
political accountability is shifted from federal officials to state
officials.0 5 The court concluded that Brady is not another
"instance of cooperative federalism" because in this instance,
"one party [was] never given the opportunity to decide whether
to cooperate." 106
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
On June 27, 1997, the Supreme Court put the background
check requirement of the Act to rest. 17 Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, noted that not only is there a paucity of "executive-
commandeering statutes in the early Congress," but until recently
such statutes were absent in this country's later history.0 8 The
Court illustrated this proposition with such examples as the Act of
IL0Id. at 457.
301 Id. at 459-60.
'02 Id. at 457.
103 Id at 460.
'04 Id. at 457.
105 Id. at 460.
106 Id. at 462.
"o See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
'0o Id. at 2375.
[Vol 14540
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August 3, 1882,19 and the World War I selective draft law,"'
among others.
The Court explained that it was "incontestable that the
Constitution established a system of 'dual sovereignty'" 1' and
that although the States had given up much of their power to the
emerging government, there still remained "a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty."" 2 Justice Scalia noted that the Framers
chose a system in which state and federal government enjoyed
concurrent authority as opposed to a system that utilized a central
government."' He explicitly declined to elaborate any further on
the historical record, instead referring to the Court's opinion in
New York v. United States."4
The Court then stated that the Framers chose a Constitution
that allowed Congress to regulate individuals not States." 5 One
of the innovations of this design, the Court postulated, was that
the citizens of this country would have two orders of government
- one federal and one state." 6  Thus, the Constitution
contemplated that a State government would "represent and
remain accountable to its own citizens." " 7 In this section of the
opinion, the Court concluded these "securities" preserved the
109 Id. (citing Act of August 3, 1882, ch. 376, §§ 2, 4, 22 Stat. 214-15
(1882)). This statute enlisted state officials to assist with immigration matters
in local ports. Id. Justice Scalia made certain to point out however, that the
duties required of the state officials by the statute were not actual mandates.
Id.
"' Id. (citing Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 6, 40 Stat. 80-81 (1917)). The
draft law authorized President Wilson "to utilize the service of any or all
departments and any or all officers or agents of the United States and of the
several States... in the execution of this Act." Id. Once again, Justice
Scalia noted that it was not clear, that this authorization, utilizing the service of
the state officers, was actually an authorization to compel them. Id.
U Id. at 2376 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)).
" Id. (further citations omitted).113 Id. at 2377.
1 4 Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 161-66).
"I Id. (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 166).
116 Id. (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 799, 838 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
117 Id. (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69).
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division of power between the state and the federal
government. 118
The majority turned finally to the prior jurisprudence of the
Court and stated that recent opinions have made it clear that the
"[f]ederal [g]overnment may not compel the States to implement,
by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory
programs.""' 9 Justice Scalia made it clear that when the Court
was faced with a federal statute that "unambiguously required the
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program," the
Court held that the federal government could do neither."'
The Court explained that the Act is distinguishable from the
"take title" provisions held unconstitutional in New York v.
United States because the Act is addressed to individuals (the
CLEOS) while the "take title" provision in New York was
addressed to the State itself.'2 ' This difference did not seem
particularly troublesome to the Court. The majority reasoned that
although the Act is "directed to individuals," it is directed to
individuals in their capacity as state officers." These officials
then function as agents for the state, making the distinction
between this case and New York one more of form rather than
substance. 3
In conclusion, the Court quoted Justice O'Connor's opinion in
New York v. United States in which she theorized that the division
of power embodied in the Constitution was designed to protect
the people from "their own best intentions."' 24  Justice Scalia
reiterated that the Court would adhere to the principles stated in
New York and categorically concluded that "'the Federal
Government [would] not compel the States to enact or administer
a federal regulatory program.' The mandatory obligation
18 Id. at 2378.
"' Id. at 2380 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982)).
'oId. (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 188).
,21 Id. at 2382. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
122 Id.
173 Id.
124 Id. at 2383 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 187).
25 Id. (quoting New York, 505 U.S.. at 188).
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imposed on the CLEOS by the Act clearly "runs afoul of [this]
rule." 126
V. THE UNDERLYING POLICY ISSUES
On December 3, 1996, Sheriffs Printz and Mack argued their
case before the Supreme Court.27  At issue was the
constitutionality of the background check provision of the Act. 2
Both Petitioner and Respondent relied extensively on New
York, just as the Fifth Circuit did in Koog 229 In New York, the
Court considered whether Congress could direct the States to
regulate in a specific field or in a specific way.'O In doing so,
the Court was guided by several principles,' 3' as it was in the
instant case.132
First, even though Congress has the power to directly govern
the Nation, the Constitution does not give Congress the absolute
power to mandate that the States govern according to its
wishes.133 By requiring the CLEOs to carry out specific tasks in
a specified manner, Congress removed the prerogative of the
States to mandate and enforce policies in the manner that the
individual States saw fit. In the words of Chief Justice Chase,
"the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their
governments, are as much within the design and care of the
126 Id.
127 See Steve Lash, U.S. Supreme Court Weighs Constitutionality of Brad),
Handgun Violence Protection Act, Dec. 4, 1996, available in 1996 WL
690714.1 Id.
129 See Koog v. United States, 79 F.3d 452 (5' Cir. 1996).
30 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
131 Id.
132 The decision in New York was a major factor in the Court's decision in the
Printz decision. In Printz, Justice Scalia stated "We held in New York that
Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory
program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by
conscripting the State's officers directly." Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct.
2365, 2384 (1997).133New York, 505 U.S. at 162.
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Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance
of the National government." 
1 34
The question of whether Congress could use state governments
to administer its regulations was hotly debated at the
Constitutional Convention. 135 Two models of structure for the
nascent government came to the forefront: the Virginia Plan and
the New Jersey Plan. 136  Under the Virginia Plan, Congress
would legislate directly upon individuals without using the States
as go-betweens.137 Under the New Jersey Plan, Congress would
still need the approval of the States to legislate. 38 Eventually, the
Framers adopted the Virginia Plan, favoring direct Congressional
authority over individuals rather than States. 39
In a spirit of cooperative federalism, Congress would be able
to encourage States to regulate in a specific way.140 For example,
in New York, the Court found that there were two methods where
Congress could regulate States and still fall within constitutional
bounds.14' First, Congress could " 'attach conditions [to] the
receipt of federal funds.' "142 Since no federal money was held
134 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868), overruled on other grounds by
Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885), quoted in New York, 505 U.S.
at 162. See also Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2381 (explaining that "it is an essential
attribute of the States' retained sovereignty that they remain independent and
autonomous within their proper sphere of authority") (citing Texas v. White,
74 U.S. at 725).
,' New York, 505 U.S. at 164.
136 Id. at 164 (citing 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 18,
242 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)).
137 Id.
138 [d.
131 Id. at 165. See also Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2377 ("The Framers' experience
under the Articles of Confederation had persuaded them that using the States as
the instruments of federal governance was both ineffectual and provocative of
federal-state conflict.").
140NeW York, 505 U.S. at 166.
141 Id. at 167.
142 Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)
(conditioning the receipt of highway funds upon the States' adoption of a
minimum drinking age)). See also Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2376 (distinguishing
statutes that "are connected to federal, funding measures" as "more accurately
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out to the States to encourage them to participate in the Act,
Brady did not utilize this method.
Ironically enough, the CLEOs were required to spend the time
and money of their respective States to check numerous records
with no federal remuneration. This can hardly be categorized as
cooperative federalism, because "there is nothing 'cooperative'
about a federal program that compels state agencies ... to function
as bureaucratic puppets of the Federal Government."'13 Most
certainly, this could not pass Constitutional muster under New
York. 14
Secondly, it is well recognized that Congress has the power to
offer States a choice - either regulate an activity according to
federal directives or have that activity preempted.145  Under the
Act, Congress offered no choice to the States because it did not
choose to preempt state law and administer the program directly.
Rather, Congress commandeered the CLEOs to bear the burden
of administering Brady or face criminal penalties. 146 The Act did
not merely encourage, as the aforementioned methods did, it
compelled, and in doing so it did not allow the States the
prerogative of compliance. Such behavior on the part of
described as conditions upon the grant of federal funding than as mandates to
the States.").
43 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 783 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (highlighting the difference between federal
programs that offer States a choice and those that do not). See also Printz, 117
S. Ct. at 2381 (noting that Congress may not make the states "ventriloquist
puppets" (quoting Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th Cir. 1975 )).
14aSee Brady Act Found Unconstitutional, 10 FIEAMS LrMG. REP. 2, 5
(1996) (stating that the Brady Act is not an example of cooperative
federalism).
145 New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (recognizing that if a State
chooses not to participate in a federal program Congress may bear the
regulatory burden and directly administer the program)). See also Printz, 117
S. Ct. at 2381 (explaining that the Court has upheld statutory provisions
merely imposing "preconditions to continued state regulation of an otherwise
pre-empted field" (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 759-71)).
1 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(5) provides: "Whoever knowingly violates subsection
(s) ... of section 922 shall be fined not more than $1,000, imprisoned for not
more than [one] year, or both." Id.
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Congress blurs, and thereby diminishes, the accountability of
both state and federal officials,'47 a situation that is clearly an
affront to the very concept of the Bill of Rights. 1
48
The Court realized, as it did in New York, that compelling the
CLEOs to administer the Act would ultimately subject them to the
disapproval of their constituents.' 49 Since Congress was actually
behind the program, voter disapproval would be misplaced. 150 As
the majority wrote in New York, accountability will be
"diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials
cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local
electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation." '
Congress has the power to preempt States in various fields and
has done so in many other areas. 52 Preemption in the gun
control area would put the responsibility for the program where it
belongs, with Congress. The CLEOs must not be conscripted to
carry out the wishes of Congress for it is clear that "[t]he Federal
147 See Caminker, supra note 51, at 1065.
'48 U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
149 See Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2382 In Printz, Justice Scalia stated:
By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden
of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of
Congress can take credit for 'solving' problems without
having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with
higher federal taxes. And even when the States are not
forced to absorb the costs of implementing a federal
program, they are still put in the position of taking the blame
for its burdensomeness and for its defects.
Id.
150 Id.
151 New York, 505 U.S. at 169.
152 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assoc., Inc., 452
U.S. 264, 288-90 (1981) (noting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,
525-26 (1977)); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649-50 (1971); Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-43 (1963);
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767,
772-76 (1947).
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Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program.""'
CONCLUSION
Although the public policy concerns that instigated the
background-check provision of Brady are laudable, they cannot
be used as the basis for ignoring the precepts that underlie the
Constitution. The Supreme Court realized this when it stated:
[T]he Constitution protects us from our own best
intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and among
branches of government precisely so that we may resist
the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an
expedient solution to the crisis of the day. The [present
issue] is a pressing national problem, but a judiciary that
licensed extraconstitutional government with each issue of
comparable gravity would, in the long run, be far
worse.15
Brady purports to address an admittedly real danger.
However, there are far greater dangers inherent in its
implementation. As Justice Brandeis illuminated:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to
protect liberty when the Government's purposes are
beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to
repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding. 155
1 New York, 505 U.S. at 188. See also Priniz, 117 S. Ct at 2384
("Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory
program.").
1 New York, 505 U.S. at 187-88.
1 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) overnded in part, Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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We should be reminded that " 'those who give up essential
liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty
nor safety.' "156
Patricia A. Rooney*
156 People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 501, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1345, 583
N.Y.S.2d 920, 937 (1992) (quoting BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, HISTORICAL
REvIEw OF PENNSYLVANIA (1759)).
* The author would like to express her warmest gratitude to Professor Rena
Seplowitz of Touro Law Center for her invaluable guidance and support in
writing this article. The author would also like to express her gratitude to her
fiancee, Hal Kaplan, whose emotional support and devotion have made this
work possible.
548 [Vol 14
22
Touro Law Review, Vol. 14 [1998], No. 2, Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss2/15
